A circulating claim that smart televisions can record and store audio even when they appear to be off, track everything their owners watch, and be hacked remotely and turned into covert surveillance devices is a blend of documented capability and overstatement. A review of 12 primary sources, using LG's 65-inch OLED G5 (model OLED65G5WUA) as the reference device, found enough substance in the claim to rule it out as baseless โ but not enough to endorse it in full.
The tracking element is the most solidly grounded. Modern connected TVs are networked computers first and displays second: they run internet-linked software platforms, ship with microphones for voice control, and gather usage information as part of their smart features. Remote compromise, the claim's third element, falls within a well-documented class of risk for any always-connected consumer device, and the reviewed record treats the hijacking scenario as a credible possibility rather than science fiction.
The first and most alarming element โ televisions capturing and storing audio while appearing to be powered down โ is where the claim stretches furthest. The distinction between a set that is fully off, one in standby, and one merely idle on the network is central here, and the reviewed material does not establish routine audio capture in the fully powered-down state. Under normal operation, microphone input is tied to voice-assistant interactions, a narrower behavior than the continuous eavesdropping the claim implies.
The scrutiny lands squarely on LG, whose OLED lineup supplied the fact-check's case study, and by extension on Samsung, which operates a comparable smart TV platform. As both companies layer AI-driven voice assistance and recommendation features into their sets, the boundary between convenience and surveillance is drawn less by hardware than by disclosure, default settings and patch discipline โ the areas where regulators and security researchers are likely to keep pressing.
On balance, the claim earns a rating of Partly True: the viewing-tracking and remote-hacking components are supported by the record, while the always-listening-while-off element remains the part the evidence does not fully establish.