The core claim

Air-gapped systems are typically assumed to be isolated because they are physically disconnected from the internet or external networks. However, the claim under examination holds that this separation does not, by itself, prevent backdoor access when a compromised device can communicate over wireless channels — such as radio, Bluetooth, or other electromagnetic side channels — that do not rely on the wired network connection.

The review of primary sources found this to be largely accurate: a backdoor embedded in firmware or hardware can, in principle, exfiltrate data or receive commands via wireless means even on a machine with no network cable attached. Network separation addresses one attack surface, not all of them.

Where the nuance lies

The assessment was rated "mostly true" rather than fully true, indicating that the blanket framing — that air-gapping "cannot" block wireless backdoors — overstates the case to some degree. Practical exploitation of such channels typically requires a pre-installed compromise and specialized conditions, and the reviewed sources do not establish that wireless backdoors are a routine or widespread occurrence. The claim is directionally sound but should not be read as proof that air-gapped systems are routinely breached this way.

Bottom line

The claim is rated as mostly true.